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Author's Declaration 
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including 
any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. 
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Abstract 
In the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm, the stimuli for two separate tasks are 
presented in rapid succession. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) is typically varied, resulting 
in slower responses to Task 2 for shorter SOA. This slowing is referred to as PRP interference. 
Previous results have suggested that introspective estimates of response time are not sensitive to 
PRP interference. That is, although response time to Task 2 is slowed substantially at shorter 
SOAs, estimates of this response time typically do not vary with SOA. One interpretation of 
these findings is that perception of the stimulus for Task 2 is delayed during processing of Task 
1. Therefore, according to this interpretation, introspective response times (IRTs) are not 
sensitive to PRP interference because the second stimulus (S2) is not perceived while the 
interference is occurring. Across two experiments using different approaches, I found that IRTs 
are still not sensitive to PRP interference under conditions in which delayed perception of S2 is 
precluded. The lack of sensitivity is therefore not dependent on perception being delayed, and 
must have had some other cause in my experiments. My results are consistent with an existing 
account in which IRTs are based on the perceived difficulty of each trial rather than on mental 
timing. However, the results may be best explained by an account in which people simply are not 
very good at estimating durations while under cognitive load. 
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Overview of Previous Research 
The use of introspection may be necessary to fully answer certain questions about the 
human mind, especially those regarding the nature of conscious experience. Unfortunately, 
introspective reports are highly subjective and often inaccurate about which mental processes are 
occurring (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As a result, researchers have increasingly endeavoured to 
use introspection in a more controlled way (e.g. Corallo, Sackur, Dehaene, & Sigman, 2008; 
Reyes & Sackur, 2014).  
Corallo et al. (2008) designed a methodology that they called quantified introspection, 
wherein research participants produce quantitative reports of their introspective experience after 
each trial of a task. For example, they asked participants to estimate their own response time to 
every trial of a simple task and compared these subjective but quantitative introspective response 
times (IRTs) to the actual response times (RTs). They argued that this method can be used to 
identify which cognitive processes are accessible to introspection, reasoning that processes that 
are accessible to introspection should influence both RTs and IRTs, whereas those that cannot be 
accessed should influence only RTs.  
Corallo et al. (2008) found that introspective and actual RTs followed the same pattern 
when only one task had to be performed, suggesting complete introspective access, but diverged 
in an overlapping tasks paradigm. The overlapping tasks, or Psychological Refractory Period 
(PRP), paradigm (see Pashler, 1994; Pashler & Johnston, 1989; Telford, 1931) involves the 
presentation of stimuli for two separate tasks in rapid succession. The general result is the PRP 
interference effect: Response to Task 2 is slower when the time between onset of the two stimuli 
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(i.e. the stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) is shorter. This is because most tasks involve a 
'central' stage of processing that requires central resources, which process information serially 
(Pashler, 1994). This creates a bottleneck during which Task 2 central processing is queued 
while central resources are used for Task 1. Corallo et al. (2008) found that although decreasing 
SOA caused the expected increase in RT to Task 2, the corresponding introspective measure was 
completely insensitive to SOA. They interpreted this result as indicating that Task 2 queue time 
is inaccessible to introspection. 
Marti, Sackur, Sigman, and Dehaene (2010) conducted a thorough follow-up study, 
asking four quantitative introspection-based questions after each trial of a PRP task. In addition 
to the RT estimates for the two tasks, they had participants estimate the SOA as well as the 
amount of time between their response to Task 1 and the onset of the second stimulus (S2), 
which they referred to as “slack time” when S2 occurs first and “free time” when the response 
occurs first. Their main finding, in addition to replicating Corallo et al.’s (2008) results, is that 
participants tended to overestimate short SOAs and to under-report slack time. Their data are 
consistent with an account in which, regardless of SOA, S2 is not consciously perceived until 
central resources are released from Task 1. This interpretation is consistent with dual-stage 
models of conscious access, which hold that conscious access requires central resources 
(Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Chun & Potter, 1995), and fits in with other evidence 
that perception of S2 is delayed in the PRP paradigm (e.g. Marti, Sigman, & Dehaene, 2012). 
 Ruthruff and Pashler (2010), however, provided some evidence that the insensitivity of 
introspection to PRP interference does not depend on delayed perception. They asked whether 
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time estimation itself is subject to the central bottleneck, and had participants perform time 
estimation as Task 2 in a PRP paradigm. In one of their experiments, for example, participants 
judged the brightness of a stimulus and then indicated when they thought a given duration had 
passed from the onset of that stimulus. The duration of the bottleneck was varied by 
manipulating the difficulty of Task 1 rather than the magnitude of an SOA. If time estimation is 
subject to the central bottleneck, then time should not be estimated during Task 1 central 
processing, and overall durations should therefore be underestimated by the duration of this 
processing stage. When Task 1 was more difficult, and therefore took longer, participants did 
underestimate duration to a greater degree, however the magnitude of underestimation was 
smaller than what would be expected if mental timing processes were queued behind Task 1 
processing. Ruthruff and Pashler (2010) concluded that time estimation is only partially subject 
to the central bottleneck. Importantly, because the two tasks used the same stimulus, these results 
cannot be explained by delayed perception of S2. Therefore something other than delayed 
stimulus perception must have contributed to the underestimation of time found by Ruthruff and 
Pashler (2010), and may also have contributed to the results found by Corallo et al. (2008) and 
Marti et al. (2010). One possibility, as suggested by Ruthruff and Pashler (2010), is that mental 
timing, rather than, or in addition to, conscious access, is subject to the central bottleneck. 
Another possibility is simply that performance on timing tasks is poor under concurrent load. 
There is a large literature showing that concurrent loads interfere with duration judgments, often 
resulting in underestimation (e.g. Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 1994; Brown, 1997; Block, 
Hancock, & Zakay, 2010). This is usually interpreted as evidence that time estimation draws on 
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the same pool of resources required for other tasks (Brown, 1997; Ogden, Salominaite, Jones, 
Fisk, & Montgomery, 2011). Performing two tasks concurrently could therefore tax resources 
that are required for time estimation. 
 Three points leave the door open for a delayed perception account of Corallo et al. (2008) 
and Marti et al.'s (2010) findings. First, Ruthruff and Pashler (2010) found only partial 
underestimation of PRP interference time. Therefore delayed stimulus perception may still be 
required to explain the complete underestimation found by Corallo et al. (2008) and others. 
Second, allocating a larger proportion of attention to a concurrent non-temporal task can lead to 
greater underestimation of duration (Macar et al., 1994). By increasing the difficulty of the non-
temporal task, Ruthruff and Pashler (2010) may have influenced participants to allocate more 
attention to that task in addition to increasing the duration of the bottleneck. Therefore it is not 
clear whether their results would generalize to experiments in which the bottleneck duration is 
manipulated using only changes in SOA. Finally, participants in Ruthruff and Pashler (2010) 
estimated an external interval rather than their own response time to a stimulus. These two types 
of judgments do not necessarily rely on the same processes. In fact, IRTs need not rely on mental 
timing at all. Bryce and Bratzke (2014) suggested that they instead depend on perceived task 
difficulty, which is presumably a good predictor of actual RT. The degree to which delayed 
perception of S2 contributes to RT underestimation is therefore unclear.  
The aim of the current study is to test the delayed perception account of temporal 
underestimation in the PRP paradigm. Although Marti et al. (2010) make persuasive arguments, 
their data cannot completely rule out alternative accounts (e.g. Ruthruff & Pashler, 2010; Bryce 
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& Bratzke, 2014). A more direct demonstration would be to show that underestimation of time 
during the bottleneck depends on perception of S2 being delayed. If IRTs are sensitive to PRP 
interference under conditions in which delayed perception is precluded, it can be concluded with 
more confidence that delayed perception is the cause of the temporal underestimation. However, 
if IRTs remain insensitive to interference under these conditions, alternative explanations must 
be identified. Such conditions were achieved in Experiment 1 by masking S2 after 100 ms, so 
that it would need to be perceived within 100 ms of onset in order to be perceived at all. 
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Experiment 1 
Methods 
 Participants. 
Twenty University of Waterloo undergraduate students (9 male, 11 female, Mage = 19.8, 
SDage = 5.3) participated in the experiment for course credit. All reported normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity and normal colour vision. 
 Apparatus. 
Displays were generated by an Intel Core i7 computer connected to a 24-in. LCD monitor 
with 640 × 480 resolution and a 60 Hz refresh rate. Audio was played through Logitech over-ear 
headphones. Responses were collected via keypress on the computer's keyboard. Participants 
viewed the display approximately 50 cm from the monitor and set the audio volume to a 
comfortable level.  
 Procedure. 
All participants completed Experiments 1 and 2 within the same session, in 
counterbalanced order. Each experiment took approximately 30 minutes, beginning with 10 
practice trials followed by six blocks of 32 experimental trials, for a total of 202 trials. No 
feedback was given during either the practice or experimental blocks. 
Experiment 1 was similar to Corallo et al. (2008) Experiment 2. Task 1 was an auditory 
discrimination task in which participants determined whether a tone was high- or low-pitched. 
Task 2 was a number comparison task in which participants determined whether a visually 
presented number was higher or lower than 45 (Figure 1). 
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Each trial began with the presentation of a black fixation cross subtending 0.6° × 0.6° on 
a white background. After 1000 ms, either a 500 Hz or 1500 Hz tone was played for 100 ms. The 
pitch was chosen randomly on a trial-by-trial basis, and was equally likely to be high or low. 
After either 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 750, or 1000 ms, a number between 21 and 69 (inclusive, 
and never 45) replaced the fixation cross in black, Times New Roman, size 24 bold font. The 
number was masked after 100 ms by a row of 12 percentage signs that remained on screen until 
response. Notation type was manipulated, with half of the numbers in each block presented in 
word form and half presented in digit form. For each notation type, half of the numbers were 
close to 45 (within 12), and half were far from 45. Each combination of distance and notation 
type occurred once at each of the eight SOAs in every block. The particular number and notation 
on a given trial was randomly chosen within these constraints.  
Participants reported whether the tone was high or low pitched by pressing the "Q" key 
with their left middle finger following a high-pitched tone and by pressing the "A" key with their 
left index finger following a low tone. They were allowed to make this response as soon as the 
auditory stimulus was presented. Participants reported whether the number was higher or lower 
than 45 by pressing the "M" key with their right middle finger following a higher number and by 
pressing the "N" key with their right index finger following a lower number.  
After the response to the number, the text "Auditory task duration?" appeared. 
Participants were instructed to report the amount of time that had elapsed between onset of the 
auditory stimulus and their "Q" or "A" button press by clicking on a scale ranging from 0 to 2400 
ms. The scale was continuous, however 0, 600, 1200, 1800, and 2400 ms were explicitly marked, 
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as well as one unlabeled tick mark between each of these values. Once a value was chosen, the 
text changed to "Visual task duration?" and participants reported their visual task duration 
estimate in the same manner. This response was followed by the text "press space" which 
remained on screen until the spacebar was pressed, inducing a 500 ms blank screen before the 
start of the next trial. Participants were reminded several times during the task instructions that 
they were to estimate the elapsed time from the onset of the relevant stimulus to their relevant 
response. They were informed that there would sometimes be a temporal gap between 
presentation of the auditory and visual stimuli, however they did not know the range or 
distribution of SOAs that would occur. 
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Figure 1. Outline of one trial of Experiment 1. RT1 = Response time to Task 1. RT2 = Response 
time to Task 2. 
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Results 
Data Analysis. 
All data from participants who failed to achieve an accuracy within 2.5 standard 
deviations of the mean accuracy on either of the tasks were removed from analysis. This 
procedure was performed recursively, resulting in the removal of data from 3 participants. The 
remaining participants averaged 94.2% (SD = 7.2%) accuracy on Task 1 and 88.6% (SD = 5.2%) 
accuracy on Task 2. Of the remaining data, trials with incorrect responses on either task (16.3%) 
as well as trials with RTs below 200 ms (0.7%) or more than 3 standard deviations above the 
mean for a given participant and SOA (2.2%) were discarded from the RT analysis.  
RT and IRT as a function of SOA. 
The RT data show the usual PRP effect, with longer responses to Task 2, but not to Task 
1, at short SOAs (Figure 2). PRP interference occurred for SOAs shorter than about 300-400 ms. 
Therefore, for the following analyses I divided the data into trials with short SOA (< 300 ms), on 
which PRP interference occurred, and those with long SOA (> 400 ms), on which interference 
did not occur. Paired samples t-tests confirmed that RT2 was longer on short SOA trials 
(MRT2,short = 968 ms) than on long SOA trials (MRT2,long = 651 ms), t(16) = 7.73, p < .001. There 
was no significant difference in RT1 between short (MRT1,short = 812) and long (MRT1,long = 782) 
SOA trials, t(16) = 0.52, p = .611. 
The pattern of IRTs matches that found by Corallo et al. (2008, Experiment 2). 
Participants seem not to have been aware of the large increase in RT2 at short SOAs, as there 
was no difference in IRT2 between short (MIRT2,short = 878 ms) and long (MIRT2,long = 909 ms) 
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SOA trials, t(16) = 1.38, p = .187. There was also no difference in IRT1 between short (MIRT1,short 
= 846 ms) and long (MIRT1,long = 835 ms) SOA trials, t(16) = 0.90, p = .381. 
1
                                                          
1 The order in which the two experiments were performed did not interact with the effect of SOA for any of the four 
measures (RT1, RT2, IRT1, or IRT2), all ps > 0.05. 
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Figure 2. Response times and introspective response times to Tasks 1 and 2 as a function of 
stimulus onset asynchrony in Experiment 1. 
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Distance and notation manipulations. 
I first analyzed the effects of the distance of the number from 45 on Task 2 RT using a 
2x2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Distance (Close vs. Far) and SOA 
(Short vs. Long) as factors (Figure 3). The slowing at shorter SOAs was reflected in a main 
effect of SOA, F(1, 16) = 46.23, p < .001, np
2 = .74. A main effect of Distance, F(1, 16) = 24.47, 
p < .001, np
2 = .61, confirmed that RTs were also slower for numbers that were closer to 45. As 
expected, the two factors did not interact, F < 1, suggesting that the distance manipulation 
influenced the central processing stage or later. The corresponding ANOVA on Task 2 IRTs 
revealed that the main effect of Distance was also present in the IRTs, F(1, 16) = 28.07, p < .001, 
np
2 = .64, with no effect of SOA, F(1, 16) = 1.91, p = .186, np
2 = .11, and no interaction, F < 1. 
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Figure 3. Average response time and introspective response time to Task 2 on trials with a 
number either close to (within 12) or far from (more than 12) forty-five, with a short (0 ms, 100 
ms, or 200 ms) or long (500 ms, 750 ms, or 1000 ms) stimulus onset asynchrony, in Experiment 
1. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
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To parallel the analysis performed by Corallo et al. (2008), I conducted a separate 2x2 
within-subjects ANOVA on Task 2 RTs with Notation (Word vs. Digit) and SOA (Short vs. 
Long) as factors (Figure 4). RTs were slower when the number was presented as a word, F(1, 16) 
= 19.71, p < .001, np
2 = .55. There was again a main effect of SOA, F(1, 16) = 58.47, p < .001, 
np
2 = .79, as well as an interaction between the two factors, F(1, 16) = 6.67, p = .020, np
2 = .29. 
The effect of notation was significant at long SOAs, t(16) = 5.36, p < .001, but only marginally 
so at short SOAs, t(16) = 1.98, p = .065, suggesting that this manipulation affected the perceptual 
stage of Task 2. The corresponding ANOVA on Task 2 IRTs did not reveal an effect of SOA, 
F(1, 16) = 1.93, p = .184, np
2 = .11. Although the pattern of IRT2s was numerically similar to the 
pattern of RT2s, neither the effect of notation, F(1, 16) = 2.46, p = .136, np
2 = .13, nor the 
interaction, F(1, 16) = 1.76, p = .203, np
2 = .10, reached significance.  
16 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average response time and introspective response time to Task 2 on trials with a 
number presented as a digit or spelled out as a word, with a short (0 ms, 100 ms, or 200 ms) or 
long (500 ms, 750 ms, or 1000 ms) stimulus onset asynchrony, in Experiment 1. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Error percentage. 
I repeated the preceding analyses using the error percentage data. Participants made 
significantly more errors on Task 1 at short SOAs than at long SOAs (Mshort = 8.7% of trials, 
Mlong = 3.8%), t(16) = 3.71, p = .002. Although Task 2 errors were also more frequent at short 
than at long SOAs (Mshort = 12.3%, Mlong = 10.0%), this effect did not reach significance, t(16) = 
1.75, p = .100.  
The effect of Distance on Task 2 error percentage was tested using a 2x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with Distance (Close vs. Far) and SOA (Short vs. Long) as factors. There was 
a significant effect of Distance, F(1, 16) = 48.28, p < .001, np
2 = .75, wherein more errors were 
made for numbers close to 45. The effect of Distance did not interact with SOA, F < 1.  
In a similar 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Notation (Word vs. Digit) and SOA 
(Short vs. Long) as factors, there was a significant effect of Notation, F(1, 16) = 8.19, p = .011, 
np
2 = .34, with more errors to words than to digits. The effect of Notation also did not interact 
with SOA, F < 1. 
Regression analysis. 
I conducted a regression analysis for each participant, including Distance, Notation, 
IRT1, RT1, RT2, and SOA as predictors of IRT2. To test whether each factor was a significant 
predictor of IRT2, I performed one-sample t-tests on each of the regression coefficients (Table 
1). The only factor that did not significantly predict IRT2 was Notation, t < 1. Distance was a 
significant predictor, with longer estimates to Close than to Far numbers, t(16) = 2.69, p = .016. 
IRT2 also increased with increasing IRT1, t(16) = 20.33, p < .001, with increasing RT2, t(16) = 
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5.73, p < .001, and with increasing SOA, t(16) = 3.40, p = .004, but decreased with increasing 
RT1, t(16) = 4.35, p < .001. The intercept was significantly positive, t(16) = 6.88, p < .001.  
A similar analysis including Distance, Notation, IRT2, RT1, RT2, and SOA as predictors 
of IRT1 revealed that neither Distance nor Notation predicted IRT1, ts < 1. IRT1 increased with 
increasing IRT2, t(16) = 13.30, p < .001, and with increasing RT1, t(16) = 4.76, p < .001, but 
decreased with increasing SOA, t(16) = 2.41, p = .028, and with increasing RT2, t(16) = 2.30, p 
= .035. The intercept was significantly positive, t(16) = 5.64, p < .001 
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Table 1. Regression coefficients from the regression analysis including Distance, Notation, 
introspective response time to Task 1 (IRT1), response time to Task 1 (RT1), response time to 
Task 2 (RT2), and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) as predictors of introspective response time 
to Task 2 (IRT2), and from the regression analysis including Distance, Notation, IRT2, RT1, 
RT2, and SOA as predictors of IRT1, for Experiment 1. 
 **Predicted variable 
Predictor **IRT1 **IRT2 
Constant ,244.97** ,191.83** 
Distance† ,997.04** 9-12.40** 
Notation‡ ,991.10** 99-1.76** 
IRT1 - ,990.74** 
IRT2 ,990.61** - 
RT1 ,990.19** 99-0.14** 
RT2 99-0.07** ,990.21** 
SOA 99-0.05** ,990.15** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001 
† Close coded as 0, Far as 1 
‡Word coded as 0, Digit as 1 
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Discussion of Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test whether PRP interference would be apparent in 
introspection under conditions that preclude a delay in perception of S2. These conditions were 
achieved by masking S2 after 100 ms. Accuracy on Task 2 therefore required that perception of 
the stimulus was not delayed by more than 100 ms. The average accuracy of 88.6% is well above 
chance performance, suggesting that participants did perceive the stimulus within this time. Two 
alternative explanations for this high accuracy might be proposed. The first is that S2 was not 
perceived at all, and accurate responses resulted from implicit processing. Unconscious number 
primes can indeed influence response times to visible stimuli (e.g. Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). 
However, an 88.6% accuracy rate to the unseen stimulus itself is not realistic, especially given 
that pressing ‘M’ or ‘N’ is not a natural response to seeing a high or low number. Also, although 
I did not ask participants whether they perceived the number, I have run through the experiment 
myself and had no problem seeing the number on every trial. The second possibility is that the 
stimulus was ‘on the road’ to being perceived after 100 ms, but was not actually perceived until 
later. That is, processing that would eventually lead to perception had begun but had not been 
completed within 100 ms. Although it is possible that it takes some time for conscious access to 
occur, there is no reason for the process of achieving this access to be slower for S2.  Dual-stage 
models of conscious access predict delayed access to S2 because processing is queued during the 
bottleneck, not because it is slowed. Therefore any processing eventually leading to conscious 
access and beginning within 100 ms should result in normal perception of S2, and any processing 
beginning after 100 ms should lead to perception of the mask instead (Enns & Di Lollo, 2000). 
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That performance was well above chance indicates that the former was true most often. One can 
therefore be confident that S2 was perceived within about 100 ms of onset. Note that this does 
not necessarily rule out the possibility that perception of S2 is usually delayed in the PRP 
paradigm, because usually ‘on-time’ perception of S2 is not necessary for accurate performance. 
It is likely that my design forced participants to adopt a strategy in which they divided attention 
between the two modalities so as not to miss S2. 
Strikingly, despite the on-time perception of S2, my results match those of Corallo et al. 
(2008), with participants failing to report the large increase in RT2 with decreasing SOA. Could 
this have been caused by a failure to accurately estimate RT2 in general? My Distance 
manipulation influenced both RT2 and IRT2 in the same manner, suggesting that introspection 
was at least somewhat sensitive to response time. Conversely, the Notation manipulation 
influenced RT2 but did not have a significant effect on IRT2. The regression analysis also 
revealed Distance, but not Notation, as a significant predictor of IRT2, indicating that the effect 
of Distance on IRT2 may have been caused by a tendency to make longer estimates following 
numbers that were closer to 45, regardless of actual RT. However, the regression coefficients for 
RT2 as a predictor of IRT2 and for RT1 as a predictor of IRT1 were both significantly positive, 
demonstrating that introspection was indeed sensitive to actual RT. Although the coefficients 
were small, IRT2 should still have been expected to increase by about 70 ms between long and 
short SOA trials. The actual change was a decrease by 30.6 ms. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that the deficit in time estimation is caused by overlap of the two tasks rather than a 
general inability to estimate response times. 
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The regression analysis also provides insight into the strategy that participants used to 
generate their response time estimates. Longer responses to Task 1 led not only to higher IRT1 
estimates but also to lower IRT2 estimates. Similarly, longer responses to Task 2 reduced IRT1 
estimates. Finally, IRT1 and IRT2 were more strongly related to each other than to either actual 
response time. This suggests that participants used a strategy in which they first selected a value 
for IRT1, and then produced IRT2 by adjusting this value based on their perceived difference 
between RT1 and RT2. This strategy makes sense given that both estimates were inputted using 
the same visual analogue scale with no interruption between the two responses. The task may 
therefore be thought of as a mixture between duration labelling and duration comparison tasks, 
rather than strictly as a duration labelling task. This makes my results even more striking, as one 
would expect that a large increase in duration would be even more salient when compared to an 
unchanged duration instead of being perceived in isolation. 
Overall, the results of Experiment 1 replicate the finding that IRTs are insensitive to PRP 
interference, and demonstrate that this insensitivity does not depend on whether perception of S2 
is delayed until the end of Task 1 central processing. Experiment 2 provides additional evidence 
by achieving the same result using a different approach. 
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Experiment 2 
Methods 
 Participants. 
Experiment 2 used the same twenty University of Waterloo undergraduate students as 
Experiment 1.  
 Apparatus. 
Experiment 2 used the same apparatus as Experiment 1, except for the headphones, as the 
experiment did not involve audio. 
 Procedure. 
 Experiment 2 followed the same procedure as Experiment 1 except for the following 
changes (Figure 5). The Task 1 stimulus was presented in the visual modality. Instead of a high 
or low pitched tone, the stimulus was a row of five percentage signs presented 1° above or below 
fixation. Participants responded by pressing the "Q" key with their left middle finger when the 
stimulus was above fixation and by pressing the "A" key with their left index finger when it was 
below fixation. The Task 2 stimulus remained the same, but instead of replacing the fixation 
cross, it replaced the Task 1 stimulus. That is, as soon as the SOA elapsed, the row of percentage 
signs disappeared and was replaced immediately by a number. This number remained on screen 
until response. The set of SOAs remained the same except for the 0 ms SOA, which was 
replaced by a 34 ms SOA. Finally, all text was presented in courier new font. 
24 
 
 
Figure 5. Outline of one trial of Experiment 2. S1 = Stimulus 1. RT1 = Response time to Task 1. 
RT2 = Response time to Task 2. 
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Results 
Data analysis. 
All data from participants who failed to achieve an accuracy within 2.5 standard 
deviations of the mean accuracy on either of the tasks were removed from analysis. This 
procedure was performed recursively, but resulted in the removal of data from only 1 participant. 
The remaining participants averaged 95.7% (SD = 6.9%) accuracy on Task 1 and 88.4% (SD = 
8.9%) accuracy on Task 2. Of the remaining data, trials with incorrect responses on either task 
(15.2%) as well as trials with RTs below 200 ms (0.1%) or more than 3 standard deviations 
above the mean for a given participant and SOA (2.2%) were discarded from the RT analysis.  
RT and IRT as a function of SOA. 
As in Experiment 1, RT2 was longer on short SOA trials (MRT2,short = 1014 ms) than on 
long SOA trials (MRT2,long = 739 ms), t(18) = 5.86,  p < .001. Unlike in Experiment 1, RT1 was 
also longer on short SOA trials (MRT1,short = 751 ms) than on long SOA trials (MRT1,long = 603 
ms), t(18) = 2.65,  p = .016. Neither IRT1 (MIRT1,short = 848 ms, MIRT1,long = 844 ms), t < 1, nor 
IRT2 (MIRT2,short = 884 ms, MIRT2,long = 921 ms), t(18) = 1.22,  p = .237, differed between short 
and long SOA trials (Figure 6).2
                                                          
2 The order in which the two experiments were performed did not interact with the effect of SOA for any of the four 
measures (RT1, RT2, IRT1, or IRT2), all ps > 0.05. 
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Figure 6. Response times and introspective response times to Tasks 1 and 2 as a function of 
stimulus onset asynchrony in Experiment 1. 
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Distance and notation manipulations. 
A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Distance (Close vs. Far) and SOA (Short vs. 
Long) as factors revealed the same pattern as in Experiment 1 (Figure 7). Responses to Task 2 
were significantly longer for numbers that were close to 45, F(1, 18) = 12.04, p = .003, np
2 = .40, 
and for trials with short SOAs, F(1, 18) = 34.78, p < .001, np
2 = .66. The two factors did not 
interact, F < 1. The corresponding ANOVA on Task 2 IRTs revealed that the main effect of 
Distance was also present in the IRTs, F(1, 18) = 10.65, p = .004, np
2 = .37, with no effect of 
SOA, F(1, 18) = 1.34, p = .262, np
2 = .07, and no interaction, F(1, 18) = 1.73, p = .205, np
2 = .09. 
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Figure 7. Average response time and introspective response time to Task 2 on trials with a 
number either close to (within 12) or far from (more than 12) forty-five, with a short (0 ms, 100 
ms, or 200 ms) or long (500 ms, 750 ms, or 1000 ms) stimulus onset asynchrony, in Experiment 
2. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
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A 2x2 within-subjects ANOVA on Task 2 RTs with Notation (Word vs. Digit) and SOA 
(Short vs. Long) as factors also matched Experiment 1 (Figure 8). Responses to Task 2 were 
significantly longer for numbers presented as words than as digits, F(1, 18) = 51.8, p < .001, np
2 
= .74, and for trials with short SOAs, F(1, 18) = 35.17, p < .001, np
2 = .66. There was a Notation 
× SOA interaction, F(1, 18) = 4.62, p = .046, np
2 = .20, with the Notation effect being significant 
at both short, t(18) = 4.68,  p < .001, and long, t(18) = 7.46,  p = .001, SOAs, but larger at long 
SOAs. The corresponding ANOVA on Task 2 IRTs revealed an effect of Notation, F(1, 18) = 
4.81, p = .042, np
2 = .21, no effect of SOA, F(1, 18) = 1.55, p = .229, np
2 = .08, and a marginally 
significant Notation × SOA interaction, F(1, 18) = 3.60, p = .074, np
2 = .17 with a larger notation 
effect at long than at short SOAs.  
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Figure 8. Average response time and introspective response time to Task 2 on trials with a 
number presented as a digit or spelled out as a word, with a short (0 ms, 100 ms, or 200 ms) or 
long (500 ms, 750 ms, or 1000 ms) stimulus onset asynchrony, in Experiment 2. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
31 
 
Error percentage. 
I repeated the preceding analyses using the error percentage data. Participants made 
significantly more errors on short than on long SOA trials for both Task 1 (Mshort = 5.5% of 
trials, Mlong = 3.3%), t(18) = 2.32, p = .032, and Task 2 (Mshort = 13.1%, Mlong = 9.3%).  
The effect of Distance on Task 2 error percentage was tested using a 2x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with Distance (Close vs. Far) and SOA (Short vs. Long) as factors. There was 
a significant effect of Distance, F(1, 18) = 20.47, p < .001, np
2 = .53, wherein more errors were 
made for numbers close to 45. The effect of Distance did not interact with SOA, F < 1.  
In a similar 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Notation (Word vs. Digit) and SOA 
(Short vs. Long) as factors, there was no effect of Notation, F(1, 18) = 0.01, p = .916, np
2 = .00, 
and no interaction with SOA, F(1, 18) = 2.79, p = .112, np
2 = .13. 
Regression analysis. 
I conducted the same regression analysis as in Experiment 1, including Distance, 
Notation, IRT1, RT1, RT2, and SOA as predictors of IRT2 for each participant (Table 1). 
Neither Notation nor Distance, ts < 1, were significant predictors of IRT2. The rest of the results 
replicated those from Experiment 1. IRT2 increased with increasing IRT1, t(18) = 14.89, p < 
.001, decreased with increasing RT1, t(18) = 5.72, p < .001, and, importantly, increased with 
increasing RT2, t(18) = 5.74, p < .001.  IRT2 also increased with increasing SOA, t(18) = 3.30, p 
= .004, and the intercept was significantly positive, t(18) = 5.15, p < .001. 
A similar analysis including Distance, Notation, IRT2, RT1, RT2, and SOA as predictors 
of IRT1 revealed that only Distance did not significantly predict IRT1, t < 1. Longer estimates 
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were made for IRT1 when S2 was a digit than when it was a word, t(18) = 3.00, p = .008. IRT1 
also increased with increasing IRT2, t(18) = 15.91, p < .001, and with increasing RT1, t(18) = 
5.71, p < .001, but decreased with increasing SOA, t(18) = 2.28, p = .035, and with increasing 
RT2, t(18) = 5.62, p < .001. The intercept was significantly positive, t(18) = 5.33, p < .001. 
33 
 
Table 2. Regression coefficients from the regression analysis including Distance, Notation, 
introspective response time to Task 1 (IRT1), response time to Task 1 (RT1), response time to 
Task 2 (RT2), and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) as predictors of introspective response time 
to Task 2 (IRT2), and from the regression analysis including Distance, Notation, IRT2, RT1, 
RT2, and SOA as predictors of IRT1, for Experiment 2. 
 **Predicted variable 
Predictor **IRT1 **IRT2 
Constant ,210.90** 151.78** 
Distance† 00-2.30** 00-2.15** 
Notation‡ ,009.28** 00-0.47** 
IRT1 - ,000.74** 
IRT2 ,000.69** - 
RT1 ,000.22** 00-0.18** 
RT2 00-0.12** ,000.26** 
SOA 00-0.03** ,000.11** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001 
† Close coded as 0, Far as 1 
‡Word coded as 0, Digit as 1 
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Response grouping. 
Sometimes participants performing PRP tasks withhold their response to Task 1 in order 
to make both responses at the same time. If done selectively on short SOA trials, such behaviour 
could result in an increase in RT1 similar to that identified in the ‘RT and IRT as a function of 
SOA’ section. I analyzed the time between responses to the two tasks to determine whether 
participants were more prone to group responses on short SOA trials in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1. For the sixteen participants whose data were included in the analyses for both 
experiments, the average interval between responses on short SOA trials was shorter for 
Experiment 1 (M = 266 ms) than for Experiment 2 (M = 387 ms), t(15) = 3.16, p = .006. 
Additionally, the average percentage of short SOA trials on which the interval between responses 
was less than 100 ms was larger for Experiment 1 (M = 31.6%) than for Experiment 2 (M = 
6.3%), t(15) = 4.26, p = .001.  
Discussion of Experiment 2 
 The goal of Experiment 2 was to use different methodology to replicate the finding from 
Experiment 1 that the insensitivity of introspection to PRP interference does not depend on 
perception of the second stimulus being delayed. This was accomplished by combining the 
stimuli for each task into a single stimulus. That is, instead of presenting a second stimulus after 
the SOA, the first stimulus was updated to include the information required to perform Task 2. 
Perception of this update should not have been delayed because the update constituted a change 
to a stimulus that was already being consciously processed, rather than a peripheral stimulus. 
Although it is theoretically possible that participants quickly encoded the stimulus and then 
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performed central processing on an internal representation, thereby not perceiving the change to 
the external stimulus, there are three reasons to believe this did not occur. First, it would be 
inefficient to encode a complete internal representation of the stimulus and then to stop sampling 
from the freely available external information (e.g. Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pook, 1997). Second, the 
shortest SOA, 34 ms, is likely shorter than the time required to encode such a representation. 
There would therefore not be enough time to encode the representation before the change 
occurred. Finally, in a departure from usual PRP results, RT1 drastically increased at short SOA, 
suggesting that the stimulus change interfered with Task 1 processing. Although an increase in 
RT1 could be caused by response grouping, my analysis indicates that responses were not 
grouped. This suggests that participants were still processing the stimulus at the time of the 
change. 
 Despite a large increase in RT2 with decreasing SOA, no such change was evident for 
IRT2, confirming that delayed perception is not a prerequisite for temporal underestimation in 
the PRP paradigm. Surprisingly, introspection also failed to detect the large increase in RT1 on 
short SOA trials. This novel finding clearly conflicts with the delayed perception account, as this 
account does not predict any interference with estimation of RT1. Also of note is that both 
introspective measures seem to follow patterns similar to those of the corresponding RTs, with 
some curvature at shorter SOAs. Does this indicate some level of awareness of the passage of 
time during the bottleneck? Not necessarily. The regression analyses for Experiments 1 and 2 
both demonstrate that IRT2s depend very strongly on IRT1s. Participants noticing that the 
stimulus change interfered with their performance on Task 1 may have produced IRT1s, and 
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therefore also IRT2s, that followed this curved pattern.  Consistent with this explanation, there 
was no such curvature in Experiment 1, in which RT1 did not vary as a function of SOA. 
However, it remains possible that the curvature was indeed caused by some awareness of time 
during the bottleneck. I will discuss this possibility in more depth in a later section. 
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General Discussion 
Previous results have shown that introspective estimates of response time are not 
sensitive to PRP interference. That is, although response time to Task 2 is slowed substantially at 
shorter SOAs, estimates of this response time typically do not vary with SOA. One interpretation 
of these findings is that perception of the stimulus for Task 2 is delayed until the completion of 
central processing of Task 1. Therefore, according to this interpretation, IRT2s are not sensitive 
to PRP interference because S2 is not perceived while the interference is occurring. 
Across two experiments using different approaches, I found that IRTs are still not 
sensitive to PRP interference under conditions in which delayed perception of S2 is precluded. 
The lack of sensitivity is therefore not dependent on perception being delayed, and must have 
had some other cause in my experiments. To be clear, my results do not show that delayed 
perception of S2 does not occur in the PRP paradigm, or that it would not cause similar results. I 
have shown that underestimation of time in the PRP paradigm cannot be taken as evidence that 
perception of S2 is delayed because underestimation occurs even in the absence of delayed 
perception. However, there is other evidence (e.g. Marti et al., 2012) that perception is delayed in 
normal PRP situations. Nonetheless, my results demonstrate that introspection is insensitive to 
PRP interference for reasons other than, or in addition to, this delay. 
 
Alternative Accounts 
One potential explanation is that introspective response times are based on perceived 
difficulty rather than on mental timing processes (Bryce & Bratzke, 2014). If this is true, one 
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would only expect an increase in IRT2 at short SOA if the task is perceived to be more difficult 
at short SOA. Bryce and Bratzke (2014) provided support for this idea by showing that 
introspective response times are related to introspective reports of task difficulty, and suggested 
that error percentage may be useful for estimating perceived task difficulty. Unfortunately,  the 
effect of SOA on error percentage has not been reported in other studies. My error data do not 
support the perceived difficulty account. Error percentage was significantly higher at short SOA 
for Task 1 in both Experiments 1 and 2, and for Task 2 in Experiment 2, whereas neither IRT1 
nor IRT2 differed between long and short SOAs in either experiment. These results do not 
necessarily contradict the perceived difficulty account, because it could be that error percentage 
is not actually well coupled to perceived difficulty. However, it is also not clear how perceived 
difficulty could account for the curvature found in the IRTs in Experiment 2.  
A potential explanation that can account for the curvature is that people simply are not 
very good at estimating time in multi-task situations. As discussed earlier, time estimation is very 
sensitive to disruption, with almost any concurrent task resulting in shortened and/or more 
variable estimates of time (Brown, 1997). Accordingly, it does not seem very surprising that 
duration is underestimated during performance of four overlapping tasks (i.e. two timing tasks 
and two non-temporal tasks). The result that IRTs are completely insensitive to PRP interference 
appears noteworthy because it seems to imply that the passage of time, rather than simply being 
poorly estimated during the bottleneck, is not perceived at all. However, this interpretation is 
based on the assumption that bottleneck time does not contribute at all to RT estimates for short 
SOA trials. This is presumably an attractive assumption because estimates on short SOA trials 
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are roughly the same as those on long SOA trials, during which there is no bottleneck. Bryce and 
Bratzke (2014) revealed the flaw in this assumption by demonstrating that, if mental timing does 
not begin until the offset of Task 1 central processing, IRT2 should decrease with decreasing 
SOA. This is because the duration of the early processing stages of Task 2, which can occur in 
parallel with central processing of Task 1, would not be included in time estimates on short SOA 
trials, but would be included on long SOA trials. The finding of equal IRTs on short and long 
SOA trials is therefore consistent with an account in which the passage of time is perceived, 
albeit with poor accuracy, during the bottleneck.  
The Use of Time Estimation in Quantified Introspection 
The original intent of the work done by Corallo et al. (2008) was to determine which 
processes are accessible to introspection. I believe that their approach of quantified introspection 
is a clever and useful research tool. However, the usefulness of introspective response time as the 
quantitative measure may be limited to the study of time estimation itself. This is because time 
estimation processes are extremely sensitive to context, and break down with almost any 
concurrent task (Brown, 1997). For example, it cannot be concluded that Corallo et al.’s (2008) 
findings are caused by a lack of introspective access to the central bottleneck, because time 
estimation processes do not necessarily operate reliably and consistently whenever cognitive 
processes are accessible to introspection. The use of quantified introspection on problems such as 
‘Which cognitive processes are accessible to conscious report?’ would therefore be best served 
by a measure that is relatively insensitive to context. Perhaps estimation of response time is more 
reliable than the estimation of external durations studied in most past research, however that 
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remains to be seen. Future work should focus on identifying more potential quantifiable 
introspective measures, as well as uncovering how time estimation processes are influenced by 
the central bottleneck. 
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